The two drawings attached are included as an attempt to illustrate the circumstances of the unit. (Co. I, 162nd Inf. Regt., 41st Inf. Div.) at the time of the incident described hereafter. Drawing No.1 more or less depicts Co .I's location in respect to the very large and heavilly fortified Japanese emplacement protecting the Japanese Salamaua Naval Base. They had employed several months in these preparations, and they had this massive facility reinforced by artillery, heavy and light mortars, and at least one large calibre Naval cannon.

(note: please excuse the very amateurish sketches attached. This writer (me) is legally blind and can only see, and then not very well, a few inches from the nose; can't see well enough to read; is literally color blind, and therefore can't produce much of anything with a very professional aspect. But, perhaps even a poor illustration may serve to lend more clarity to recounting the occurance than words alone. Written reports do not reflect the gravity of the situation.)

Our Regiment (162nd), made many, and continuous attacks, trying to advance from their beachfront at Tambu Bay, Boisi village area, and from several areas from the North, without noticeable results. The Jap fortifications were very well prepared with excellent interlocking support from MG's and artillery.

We had two batteries of artillery (105 mm) and heavy mortars emplaced to the West of Boisi Village that were invaluable as our support. We received little air support, and no surface Navy support that I was aware of, except three PT boats that Gen. MacArthur used to escape the Phillippines with his family.

A few weeks into the continuing U.S. attacks on the fortified peninsula, Co.. I of the 162nd, managed to advance up the ridge to the North of Boisi Village, and gained a position on a rather flat promitory on the trail, about 70 or so yards E to W, and on the order of 35 or so yards wide, with much undercover and a very large Gum type tree more or less centered, and with very steep brush covered sides, except for where the ridgeline (ScoutRidge) connected to E and W. Soon after the advance squad, including myself, gained the position, we realized we were only maybe a hundred yards or so from the big Jap position to our front (East). This looked like an excellent position if we could get dug in and hold it. The big tree, with judicious trimming, might serve as an artillery OP, and the spot should serve as a fine patrol base. We needed to scout the big emplacement to our front in order to locate any possible weak points that could be exploited.

Even though we tried to contain activity such as digging and moving around the flat top of that part of the ridge, we were nonetheless soon discovered by the Japanese. This revealed that we were probably dug in, and a definite threat to their flank.